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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0000  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000  
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018

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SUBJECT: REQUEST TO ALLIES FOR NEW DEMARCHE TO CHINA REGARDING CHINA'S JANUARY 2007 ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

REF: (A)07 STATE 4837 (NOTAL), (B)07 BEIJING 331, (C)07 BEIJING 473, (D)07 STATE 4836, (E)07 BEIJING 4185

CLASSIFIED BY ACTING U/S FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (T) JOHN C. ROOD, REASONS, 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1.(SBU) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 3 below.

2.(S) BACKGROUND: On January 11, 2007 (UTC), China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test by launching a ground-based weapon against one of it

3.(S) GUIDANCE REQUEST: For Berlin, Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo: Ambassador or other senior Embassy offic

5.The U.S. demarche to China in paragraph 5 should be left as a non-paper for host Nation's information. Embassies are requested to provide cor

4.(SBU) BEGIN CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS: a. (S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) FOR ALL:

-- The United States delivered a demarche to the People's Republic of China on or about January 7, 2008, concerning China's continued refusal t

-- Despite expressions of concern by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, France and several other nations, Ch

-- Over the nearly 12 months since these demarches, the U.S. has made numerous follow-up requests for answers in both diplomatic and military-t

-- The United States requests your government's assistance in applying diplomatic pressure to the Chinese government to respond to several impc

-- We have provided China with a non-paper detailing our specific concerns. We are sharing this non-paper with you and other key allies.

-- We look forward to continuing our discussions with your government on this topic. b. (S//REL AS, CA, JP, ROK, and UK) For Canberra, London,

END CAPITAL-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS.

5.(S//REL AS, CA, FR, GM, IS, IT, JP, ROK, and UK) BEGIN U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

-- As Ambassador Randt explained in a demarche to Assistant Foreign Minister He on January 15, 2007, and in follow-up discussions throughout 20

--- Debris from China's ASAT test has increased hazards to other peaceful uses of space in low earth orbit by the United States and other space

--- This is a very serious matter for the entire international community.

-- Unfettered access to space and the capabilities provided by satellites in orbit are vital to United States national and economic security.

--- The United States considers space systems to have the rights of unhindered passage through, and operations in, space without interference.

--- Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considere

--- The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its space systems with a

--- Purposeful interference with the space systems of other nations which are used by the United States for peaceful purposes in pursuit of U.S

-- It has been nearly a year since China intentionally destroyed an aging weather satellite using a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT weapon.

--- Since this flight-test occurred on January 11, 2007, the United States has detected and tracked over 2,500 pieces of orbital debris directl

--- Our experts estimate that many of these pieces, and as many as 100,000 smaller debris objects, some of which will remain in orbit for the r

-- Currently, of all identified satellite (spacecraft and rocket bodies) breakup debris now in low Earth orbit, 45 percent was generated by Chi

--- China is now responsible for more breakup debris in low earth orbit than any other state.

-- We have already been compelled to take precautionary measures to maneuver U.S. satellites to reduce the probability of collision with the de

--- China's intentional destruction of a satellite, and the resultant creation of long-lived debris, is contrary to international Space Debris

--- Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, China may be liable for damage caused by debris from Ch

-- The contradiction between China's statements and actions in this area raise questions about the credibility of China's declaratory policies

-- The United States believes China's development and testing of such capabilities is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our

--- The inadequate nature of China's response to our January 15, 2007, demarche and your government's continued unwillingness to provide a full

-- As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his meeting with President Hu on November 6, 2007, the United States remains interested in talking to

--- Such a dialogue could help reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

-- As we look to the future, we expect China to bear in mind the requirement under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, to which China is part

-- The U.S. is refraining from any expansion of space-related cooperation with China. One of the primary reasons for this position is the conti

--- What analysis did China perform to estimate the debris that would be caused by the intentional destruction of your satellite in the January

--- What steps did China take to mitigate damage to the satellites of other countries?

--- What are China's future intentions for its direct-ascent ASAT development and testing program?

--- Will there be further tests of a direct-ascent anti- satellite weapon or other anti-satellite weapons, capabilities, or technologies? If sc

---- How will your government ensure that further testing does not create new hazards for human spaceflight and other space activities?

---- What notification will China provide for any future ASAT tests?

